道家元伦理学  

Daoist Metaethics

作　　者： 张达玮(译) Jason Dockstader;Zhang Dawei

机构地区：[1]爱尔兰科克大学哲学系 [2]仲恺农业工程学院马克思主义学院

出　　处：《价值论与伦理学研究》2024年第1期64-82,258,共20页Axiology and Ethics

基　　金：国家社科基金重大项目“中国西南道教文献整理与数据库建设”(21&ZD249)子课题“重庆道教文献收集整理”的阶段性成果

摘　　要：在当代元伦理学中,道德反实在论面临着很多问题,其中之一是错误论的“为之奈何”问题。持有错误论信念的人将无法跟他人进行有效的道德对话。道家伦理能够为解决“为之奈何”问题提供一个令人满意的解答和参考。道家在元伦理学上倾向于温和的道德废除主义,以及保守的道德虚构主义。持有道德错误论信念的道家圣人致力于寻求内心的清静,认为道和天地万物之中不存在绝对的道德意义,自己可以做到不相信或假装相信日常话语中的道德意义。但这种态度不是断言的或苛刻的,而是非断言的和温和的,道家圣人不会要求他人也相信道德错误论。在日常的道德交往和对话中,道家圣人乐于扮演“愚人”角色,通过“真诚的伪装”来跟他人进行正常的交流。如此一来,道家的道德行动者就能在持有道德错误论的同时,参与到正常的道德对话中,从而很好地化解了“为之奈何”问题。This paper seeks to show how classical Chinese Daoist philosophy(道家)contributes to contemporary metaethics.Daoism off ers an early form of moral error theory and provides unique suggestions for what one can do with a false discourse like morality.Recent error theorists have disagreed about whether they should conserve moral discourse(moral conservationism),retain it only as a useful fi ction(revolutionary moral fi ctionalism),substitute it with a discourse concerned with subjective normative attitudes(moral substitutionism),or abolish it altogether(assertive moral abolitionism).In Daoist texts,I argue,we fi nd unique versions of abolitionism and fi ctionalism that go a long way to resolving debates between error theorists.They can do so because the motivation Daoists have for holding their metaethical views is primarily therapeutic.I argue Daoism offers a nonassertive kind of moral abolitionism and a reactionary form of moral fictionalism as means toward the achievement of tranquility and joy.

关 键 词：道家 《老子》 《庄子》 元伦理学 错误论 废除主义 虚构主义 

分 类 号：B82-092[哲学宗教—伦理学] B223