主体性的分野——论海德格尔对康德人格理论的诠释  

The Divergency of Subjectivity:On Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant's Theory of Person

作　　者：谈伟 TAN Wei(Department of Anthropology and Philosophy,University of Halle-Wittenberg)

机构地区：[1]德国哈勒-维滕贝格大学哲学系暨“欧洲启蒙运动跨学科研究中心”

出　　处：《当代中国价值观研究》2025年第1期74-85,共12页Chinese Journal of Contemporary Values

基　　金：国家留学基金管理委员会“国家建设高水平大学公派研究生项目”(留金选[2020]71号)的阶段性成果。

摘　　要：依托对康德人格理论的诠释,海德格尔从近代主体性中引出其此在学说,以实现对主体性的实践转向。然而,海氏将康德先验人格归于传统存在论之下,忽视了其自发性存在的维度。而且,康德道德人格是身体性的自由行动者,它业已摆脱传统存在论的限制,其存在建制根植于近代的力量存在论之中,从而自身便构成另一种实践主体,无须借助此在学说克服其缺陷。这一结果能为省察启蒙主体性之困境与出路提供新的反思视角。Through an interpretation of Kant's theory of person,Heidegger aims to direct modern subjectivity towards his own theory of“Dasein”,thereby achieving the practical turn of subjectivity.However,Heidegger attributes Kant's transcendental person to the traditional ontology,so that he overlooks that the transcendental person can also be a spontaneous activity.Additionally,Kant's moral person is a bodily free agent,which has been already got rid of the limitations of traditional ontology and is rooted in the ontology of power of modern philosophy.Therefore,Kant's moral person itself is another kind of practical subject,without the need to rely on the theory of Dasein to overcome its shortcomings.It gives us a new perspective for examining the dilemmas and solutions of the subjectivity of enlightenment.

关 键 词：主体性 先验人格 道德人格 力量存在论 

分 类 号：B516.31[哲学宗教—外国哲学]