非关联股东结盟、控股地位与盈余操纵:来自一致行动人的证据  

Alliance of Unrelated Shareholders, Controlling Status and Earnings Manipulation: Evidence from Persons Acting in Concert

作　　者：章琳一[1] 熊浩君 张洪辉[1] 邹英 Zhang Linyi;Xiong Haojun;Zhang Honghui;Zou Ying(School of Accountancy,Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics,Nanchang 330013;School of Accounting,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025)

机构地区：[1]江西财经大学会计学院,南昌330013 [2]东北财经大学会计学院,大连116025

出　　处：《管理评论》2025年第3期204-215,共12页Management Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71962010;72002086);江西省社会科学基金项目(23YJ11);江西省教育厅科技项目(GJJ2200510)。

摘　　要：近年来,中国资本市场涌现出越来越多非关联股东通过一致行动协议结盟构成控股股东,即控股型一致行动人的现象。理解并分析这一现象的经济后果是值得关注的科学问题。本文拟从盈余操纵角度分析非关联股东通过一致行动人协议结盟成控股股东的经济后果。采用可操纵性应计度量盈余操纵,本文发现,存在控股型一致行动人的公司,其盈余操纵程度更高;这一正显著关系主要体现在正向盈余操纵和中小股东结盟样本中。进一步分析发现,在民营企业和市场化程度低的地区,控股型一致行动人对盈余操纵的影响更为显著。机制检验表明,控股型一致行动人会恶化公司内部治理、“俘获”审计师以达到操纵盈余的目的。经济后果分析发现,这种盈余操纵行为最终导致控股型一致行动人公司未来业绩恶化。In recent years,it has become increasingly common in China’s capital market that unrelated shareholders form alliances through concerted action agreements to become controlling shareholders,known as controlling persons acting in concert.How to understand the economic consequences of this phenomenon is an important scientific question.This paper intends to analyze the economic consequences of unrelated shareholders forming controlling persons acting in concert from the perspective of earnings manipulation.Using manipulated accruals to measure earnings manipulation,we find that companies with controlling persons acting in concert exhibit higher levels of earnings manipulation and lower financial report quality,and this relationship is primarily manifested in upward earnings manipulation,and in subsample where minority shareholders form controlling shareholders.Further analysis indicates that in private enterprises and regions with lower degrees of marketization,the impact of controlling persons acting in concert on earnings manipulation is more pronounced.Mechanism tests suggest that controlling persons acting in concert may worsen internal corporate governance and weaken external audit supervision,so as to achieve their goal of manipulating earnings.The consequence test shows the future performance for companies with concerted controlling shareholders become worse.

关 键 词：非关联股东 盈余操纵 控股地位 一致行动人 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]