产业共生视角下园区工业废弃物资源化的政府激励机制比较研究  

Comparative study on government incentive mechanism of industrial waste recycling in in⁃dustrial parks from the perspective of industrial symbiosis

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作  者:黄小芬 Huang Xiaofen(Laboratory and Information Management DepartmentYang'enUniversity,Quanzhou Fujian 362011,China)

机构地区:[1]仰恩大学实验室与信息化管理处,福建泉州362011

出  处:《环境与发展》2025年第2期12-17,共6页Environment & Development

基  金:仰恩大学2024年校级科研培育计划项目“产业共生视角下工业固体废弃物资源化的政府激励机制研究”(SK202404)。

摘  要:政府的经济激励是促进工业废弃物资源化利用,推动生态产业共生发展的有效手段。为探究不同政府激励机制对生态工业园区中企业间产业共生合作关系的影响,本研究采用Stackel-berg博弈理论构建废弃物资源化决策模型,探讨了无政府参与、单纯补贴和奖惩并存的三种政府激励机制下的均衡状态,并通过不同政策效果的比较,为相关政策的制定提供参考依据。研究结果表明:单纯的补贴激励和奖惩并存的激励机制均能够有效促进园区废弃物资源化,而最大受益方均为上游产废企业;相较于补贴激励机制,奖惩并行的激励机制能够更好的推动共生合作,获得更高的整体共生收益。The government′s economic incentive is an effective means to promote the utilization of industrial waste resources and promote the symbiotic development of ecological industries.In order to explore the impact of different government incentive strategies on the industrial symbiosis and cooperation between enterprises in ecoindustrial parks,this paper uses Stackelberg game theory to build a waste resource decisionmaking model,and discusses the equilibrium state under three government incentive mechanisms:nongovernment participation,simple subsidies and the coexistence of rewards and punishments.To provide reference for the formulation of relevant policies.The results show that both the simple subsidy incentive and the incentive mechanism of reward and punishment can effectively promote the recycling of waste in the park,and the biggest beneficiaries are upstream waste production enterprises.Compared with subsidy incentive mechanism,reward and punishment incentive mechanism can better promote symbiotic cooperation and obtain higher overall symbiotic benefits.

关 键 词:产业共生 废弃物资源化 STACKELBERG博弈 激励机制 共生收益 

分 类 号:X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学]

 

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