功利抑或义务——汉娜·阿伦特的“思考”活动的伦理旨归  

Utilitarianismor Deontology——The Ethical Purpose of Hannah Arendt’s Thinking

作　　者：龚建伟 GONG Jian-wei(Institute for Research on Portuguese-Speaking Countries,City University of Macao,Macao 999078,China)

机构地区：[1]澳门城市大学葡语国家研究院,中国澳门999078

出　　处：《遵义师范学院学报》2025年第2期45-48,共4页Journal of Zunyi Normal University

摘　　要：汉娜·阿伦特认为思考活动能够体现出个体判断的自决性,可以抵抗具有唯一性的道德体系,因而具有抗恶的伦理意义。虽然思考是一种义务性的活动,但这并不意味着它应当被归为义务论,因为要求人类思考的原因仍然是外在的。鉴于思考的对象与目的都是现实的,故其实质上属于功利主义目的论的范畴。Hannah Arendt believes that thinking can reflect the self-determination of individual judgment and resist the unique moral system,so thinking has the ethical significance of resisting evil. Although thinking is an obligatory activity, it does not mean that it shouldbe classified as deontology, because the reason for thinking is still external. Since the object and purpose of thinking are realistic, it essentiallybelongs to the category of utilitarian teleology.

关 键 词：功利论 义务论 汉娜·阿伦特 思考 

分 类 号：B712.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学] B82-06