基于前景理论的双渠道供应链低碳合作创新博弈分析  

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Low-CarbonCooperative Innovation in a Dual-Channel Supply ChainBased on Prospect Theory

作　　者：邹筱[1] 罗慧丹 ZOU Xiao;LUO Huidan(School of Economics and Management,Hunan University of Technology,Zhuzhou,Hunan 412007)

机构地区：[1]湖南工业大学经济与管理学院,湖南株洲412007

出　　处：《商学研究》2025年第2期17-28,共12页Commercial Science Research

基　　金：湖南省教育厅科学研究重点项目“‘双碳’目标下生鲜供应链多元协同机制与实现路径研究”(22A0405);湖南省自然科学基金项目“基于价值共创的株洲市农产品平台供应链协同机制研究”(2022JJ50089)。

摘　　要：本文基于前景理论,运用演化博弈理论探讨了由制造商和零售商组成的双渠道供应链中的低碳合作创新问题。通过分析制造商和零售商二者在创新竞争中的决策行为和识别二者合作创新决策的关键影响因素,构建了二级双渠道供应链演化博弈模型。研究表明,碳排放差额费用及创新后价格增长系数对促进低碳技术合作创新有显著正向作用,但该系数存在阈值。制造商和零售商只有在大于阈值的情况下才会达成低碳合作创新共识。同时,随着创新成本的增加,双方达成低碳合作创新的概率将降低。创新主体可以通过提高低碳创新的质量和水平、控制创新成本以及增强创新收益感知来促成低碳合作创新。Based on prospect theory,this paper explores the issue of low-carbon cooperative innovation in a dual-channel supply chain consisting of manufacturers and retailers using an evolutionary game.Through analysing the decision-making behaviours of manufacturers and retailers in innovation competition and identifying the key contributing factors of their cooperative innovation decisions,we construct an evolutionary game model of the two-level dual-channel supply chain.The study shows that the coefficients of carbon differential cost and post-innovation price growth have significant positive effects on promoting cooperative innovation in low-carbon technologies,but there is a threshold value for the coefficients.Manufacturers and retailers will reach a consensus on low-carbon cooperation and innovation only when it is greater than the threshold.At the same time,the probability of reaching low-carbon cooperation between the two parties will decrease with the growth of innovation costs.Innovators can enable low-carbon cooperative innovation by improving the quality and level of low-carbon innovation,controlling innovation costs and enhancing the perception of innovation benefits.

关 键 词：前景理论 演化博弈 低碳合作创新 双渠道供应链 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F259.2[经济管理—国民经济] X196[环境科学与工程—环境科学]