股权集中度、经理人激励与技术创新选择  

Ownership concentration,managerial compensation and technology innovation choices

作　　者：杨慧军[1] 杨建君[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学管理学院,陕西西安710049

出　　处：《科研管理》2015年第4期48-55,共8页Science Research Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71272138);2013-2016;教育博士点基金(20110201110016);2012-2014

摘　　要：基于委托代理理论及技术创新理论,探讨股权集中度对企业技术创新选择的影响。以182家制造企业及高新技术企业数据为样本,利用因子分析及结构方程模型对相关假设进行检验。结果表明:(1)经理人激励在股权集中度和技术创新之间具有中介效应;(2)股权集中度和经理人短期薪酬激励呈负相关,和经理人长期薪酬激励呈正相关;(3)短期薪酬激励不利于突变创新,长期薪酬激励有利于突变创新和渐进创新。We analyze the impacts of ownership concentration on technological innovation based on the agency theory and innovation theories. By introducing managerial compensation as mediate variable,we construct the logical relationship of'ownership concentration-managerial compensation-technological innovation'. After testing our hypotheses utilizing data of 182 companies from Chinese manufacture and high-technology industries with EFA,CFA an SEM analyses,we find that managerial compensation mediate the relationship between ownership concentration and technological innovation; and ownership concentration is negativity related to managerial short-term compensation,but is positively related to managerial long-term compensation. Moreover,short-term compensation goes against radical innovation,but long-term compensation promotes both radical and incremental innovation.

关 键 词：股权集中度 突变创新 渐进创新 经理人激励 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F272.92[经济管理—国民经济]