商业银行和中央银行在反洗钱问题上的博弈  

An Analysis of the Game Between Commercial Banks and the Central Bank on the Issue of Combating Money Laundering

作　　者：原永中[1] 张新福[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行天津分行,天津300040

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2003年第3期70-73,共4页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

摘　　要：商业银行和中央银行出于各自不同的目的 ,在洗钱的问题上表现出不同的态度。双方在洗钱问题上的行为构成一个不完全信息动态博弈 ,最终会达到搏弈均衡状态。通过博弈均衡过程分析 ,可以对提高中央银行调节水平和商业银行努力程度提供新的建议。Commercial banks and the central bank extend different attitudes towards the issue of money laundering. With incomplete information the two parties stand in a dynamic game that eventually ends up in an equilibrium. The analysis of the process of the game will contribute to the improvement of control on the part of the central bank and promote effort on the part of commercial banks.

关 键 词：商业银行 中央银行 反洗钱 博弈 

分 类 号：F830.31[经济管理—金融学]