不完全信息条件下演化博弈均衡的稳定性分析  

Asymptotic Stability of Evolutionary Equilibrium under Imperfect Knowledge

作　　者：孙庆文 陆柳 严广乐[2] 车宏安[2] 

机构地区：[1]第二军医大学基础部数学物理教研室,上海200433 [2]上海理工大学管理学院,上海200093

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2003年第7期11-16,共6页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

摘　　要：基于不完全信息假设 ,借鉴生物进化过程中“复制动态”的思想 ,对非对称 2× 2演化博弈均衡进行渐近稳定性分析 ,完整地给出了其定性行为的拓扑等价分类 ,针对一些熟知的博弈模型介绍了若干新的结果 ,最后简要讨论了演化博弈论分析框架对经济行为模式动力学解释的意义 .Based on imperfect knowledge and the strategic adjustment process, the paper establishes the dynamic equations of 2×2 asymmetric evolutionary game and classifies topologically its qualitative property to deal with the problem of evolutionary stability. With the application of these studies to some economic game models, we come to some rigorous conclusions. Finally, we surveys the practical value of the framework based on evolutionary game theory.;

关 键 词：演化博弈论 渐近稳定性 动力系统 拓扑等价 系统科学 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]