公司治理、信息披露质量与知情交易  

Corporate Governance,the Quality of Information Disclosure and Informed Trading

作　　者：陈国辉[1] 胡欣[1] 刘斌[2,3] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院,辽宁大连116025 [2]大连理工大学博士后流动站,辽宁大连116024 [3]大连银行博士后工作站,辽宁大连116001

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2015年第5期55-65,共11页Journal of Audit & Economics

摘　　要：通过对公司治理、信息披露质量与知情交易之间关系的检验,发现股权集中导致的协同效应及壕沟效应同时存在,董事会规模及独立性对信息披露质量及知情交易的影响不明显,高管货币薪酬激励手段比股权激励手段更有效。研究表明,在当前我国资本市场不完善、知情交易日益增多的背景下,努力提高信息披露质量、实现股权适度分散以及合理制定高管薪酬契约对减少知情交易、维护资本市场的良好秩序具有重要意义。The separation of ownership and management caused by information asymmetric is the source of many problems in the capital market as well as the modern corporation management. To improve the quality of information disclosure and maintain the capital market to be open,fair,justice has always been the focus of theory and practice. The findings of this paper remind us that,currently the security markets of China are not perfect,informed trading and possible insider trading under this background is becoming more and more common. To improve the level of corporate governance,the quality of information disclosure of corporations has an important influence on reducing the informed trading and maintaining the order of capital market.

关 键 词：信息不对称 公司治理 信息披露质量 知情交易 资本市场 股权适度分散 高管薪酬契约 内幕交易 财务造 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]