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作 者:张正堂[1]
机构地区:[1]中国矿业大学管理学院
出 处:《中国矿业大学学报》2003年第5期517-523,共7页Journal of China University of Mining & Technology
基 金:国家自然科学基金(7002001)
摘 要:总经理报酬是总经理激励机制的主要因素,如何决定总经理报酬是迫切需要研究的问题.通过对国外相关研究的综述和结合我国上市公司特点的分析,形成了关于企业绩效、企业规模和董事会控制强度与总经理报酬之间关系的假说,并以1999和2000年上市公司为样本,首次利用协方差结构模型对总经理报酬和其影响因素之间关系的假说进行了检验和分析.实证研究表明,两年里,企业业绩、企业规模和董事会控制强度3类因素对总经理报酬的总解释率分别为8.9%和30.7%.Compensation is the primary factor in incentive system. It is a difficult problem for both native and overseas scholars to make clear the determination of executive's compensation. By reviewing overseas research in this field and analyzing the characteristics of Listed-companies in China, the paper suggests some hypothesis about the relation of executive's compensation and some factors including enterprise performance, firm scale, directorate control intensity. The Covariance Structural Model (CSM) is for the first time used to analyze the relation between the executive's compensation and its determinants in the listed-companies with the data of China listed-companies in 1999 and 2000. The model examines three factors including the enterprise's performance, the enterprise's scale and directorate control intensity. It turns out to be that the overall contribution rate of the three factors on the level of executive's compensation is 8. 9% in 1999 and 30.7% in 2000.
关 键 词:中国 上市公司 总经理报酬 影响因素 实证研究 企业业绩 企业规模 董事会控制强度 协方差结构模型 激励机制
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