基于竞赛模型的分层教学激励机制研究  

Incentive Mechanism of Ability-Based Grouping:An Economic Analysis Based on Contest Game

作　　者：陈昊 郑捷[2] 钟笑寒[2] 

机构地区：[1]国开金融有限责任公司 [2]清华大学经济管理学院

出　　处：《经济学报》2015年第4期36-61,共26页China Journal of Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(批准号:71203112;6151101095);国家自然科学基金(批准号:71173127)的资助;清华大学自主科研项目(批准号:2012Z02181;20151080397)的资助

摘　　要：本文使用竞赛模型对学校分层教学(即按能力分班)及随机分班进行评估。假定学生天赋服从均匀分布,模型表明,相对于随机分班而言,分层教学有助于促进低天赋和高天赋学生的学习,但对中等天赋学生的学习有消极影响。当学校目标是全面教学,即学校注重所有学生的成就时,随机分班优于分层教学;而当学校目标是培优教学,即关注最好学生的成就时,分层教学是更好的选择。This paper builds up a contest model to evaluate the performance of ability-based grouping vs.random grouping of students by schools.Assuming students' talent levels are uniformly distributed,our theoretical analysis shows that high-talent and low-talent students are better off under ability-based grouping in comparison to random grouping while mid-talent students are worse off.From schools'perspective,if a school cares about the total achievements of all students,random grouping is preferred to ability-based grouping.However,if a school only cares about the best student's achievement,ability-based grouping is a better choice.

关 键 词：分层教学 随机分班 竞赛模型 

分 类 号：G424[文化科学—课程与教学论]