信息不对称条件下企业家组合报酬契约模型初探  

On a Modei of Combinational Compensation Contract Under Asymmetric Information

作　　者：余津津[1] 朱东辰[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学经济学院,浙江杭州310027

出　　处：《财经论丛（浙江财经学院学报）》2003年第5期30-34,共5页

摘　　要：企业家报酬激励制度是现代企业家激励机制的重要组成部分。本文对现代企业家报酬激励制度及其实现形式进行了研究,并基于最优报酬契约理论构建了一个包含现金(短期激励)以及股票期权(长期激励)的组合报酬契约模型,最后对我国企业家报酬激励制度优化提出了几点建议。In this paper, we study the modem entrepreneur compensation system and its forms and lry to build a modei of combinational compensation contract under asymmetric Information, which combines the cash as a short-tenn incentive factor and stock option as a long-term incentive factor. And then we put forward some suggestions on how to optimize the entrepreneur compensation system of China.

关 键 词：报酬激励制度 信息不对称 组合契约 经理股票期权 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]