浅析工程招投标中的激励机制  

bid invitation and bidding

作　　者：付晓灵[1] 

机构地区：[1]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《工程建设与设计》2003年第12期26-28,共3页Construction & Design for Engineering

摘　　要：通过分析招投标与博奕论的关系,分析投标人舞弊的理论依据,提出并建立了考虑参与约束和激励相容约束下最大化招标人效用的激励机制。在竞争性公开招标中,招标人与投标人之间的博奕,可以看作是一种不完全信息静态博奕。在信息不对称的情况下,在没有任何激励措施时,投标人肯定会选择弄虚作假。Game between bidders and inviter may be known as a Uncompleted Static Game in project bid invitation && bidding. Under asymmetric information, if there is no incentive precaution, bidders will take fraud in project bid inv itation && bidding. By analysis the relation between project bid invitation&& bi dding and Game Theory, this paper suggests the basis of theory for bidders takin g fraud, and it formulates a set of incentive mechanism including Incentive-Comp atibility constraint and Individual Incentive-Compability constraint to make inv iter's revenue be maximum.

关 键 词：招投标 博奕论 混合战略均衡 效用 激励机制 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] TU723.2[经济管理—国民经济]