非营利组织团队激励机制  

Team Incentive Model of Nonprofit Organizations

作　　者：毛刚[1] 朱莲[2] 李开容[3] 郭耀煌[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,四川成都610031 [2]西安科技大学管理学院,陕西西安710054 [3]中铁二局股份有限公司青藏公路指挥部,西藏拉萨850000

出　　处：《西南交通大学学报》2004年第1期56-60,共5页Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University

摘　　要：根据Holmstrom团队理论,建立了非营利组织团队激励机制模型.该模型考虑公共产品的特点,但不计及环境因素的影响.证明了非营利组织团队在满足预算平衡或在某些制度约束的条件下Nash均衡结果的非有效性.通过引入委托人可以打破预算平衡,以解决非营利组织团队激励问题并设计团队分配方案。Based on Holmstrom's team theory, a team incentive model for nonprofit organizations was established by considering a variable of public utility and ignoring environmental effects. It was proved that there is no Nash equilibrium of the game induced by allocation schemes under the conditions of budget balance and some regulatory constraints. The incentive problem of a nonprofit organizational team can be solved and an allocation scheme can be devised by introducing a principal as the budget-breaker into the team.

关 键 词：非营利组织 团队激励机制 Holmstrom团队理论 NASH均衡 委托人 

分 类 号：C916[经济管理] F019.1[社会学]