外部薪酬-业绩敏感性、管理层权力与控制层级  

The External Fairness of CEO’s Emolument,Managerial Entrenchment and Company’s Performance

作　　者：陈震[1] 唐薇[1] 

机构地区：[1]中南财经政法大学会计学院

出　　处：《中南财经政法大学研究生学报》2015年第4期69-74,共6页Journal of the Postgraduate of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

基　　金：2014年中南财经政法大学研究生创新教育计划项目硕士生实践创新课题:权力背景下高管薪酬外部公平性的原因与后果研究(项目编号:2014S0914)

摘　　要：高管薪酬外部公平性是制定薪酬契约时需要考虑的重要因素之一,它既事关社会的公平与和谐,又影响着微观企业的经营效率。本文以控制层级为切入点,深入研究了高管薪酬外部公平性的激励效果和作用机理。实证结果表明:我国高管外部薪酬差距与企业业绩存在正向的敏感性,管理层权力能够削弱二者的敏感程度。更值得关注的是,控制层级的差异对外部薪酬—业绩敏感性产生了显著影响。其中,按照地方国企、中央国企与民营企业的控制顺序,外部薪酬—业绩敏感程度依次升高,管理层权力对薪酬-业绩敏感性的削弱作用也随之增强。The external fairness of CEO’s emolument is one of the most important factors when developing salary contract. It is not only related to the equity and efficiency of society but also influences the operating efficiency of corporate. Combined with management entrenchment,we have seriously analyzed the incentive effect of the external fairness of CEO’s emolument from a view of medium,and had a further research based on the difference of nature of property. The empirical results show that the gap between executive pay has a positive influence on corporate performance,but managerial power can undermine the relationship between them. It is noteworthy that,the difference of control level of external compensation has a significant influence to corporate performance. Among them,according to the sequence of local state- owned enterprises,state- owned central control and private enterprises,and external pay performance sensitivity have gradually increased,and the power to weaken pay performance sensitivity is also increasing. This paper enriches the existing external pay gap researches,and is aimed to optimize the contract and pay full compensation incentives provide reference and basis.

关 键 词：外部薪酬 薪酬—业绩敏感性 管理层权力 控制层级 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F272.91[经济管理—国民经济]