经理股票期权计划存在的问题及成因探析  

An Analysis of the Problems and Causes of the System of Executive Stock Option

作　　者：张筱峰[1] 刘建江[1] 杨玉娟[1] 

机构地区：[1]长沙理工大学经济学院,湖南长沙410077

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2004年第2期56-60,共5页Journal of Audit & Economics

摘　　要：经理股票期权计划(ESO)的激励功能受到肯定,但问题也不少,如经理人得自ESO的收益与公司业绩脱节;ESO的会计处理使公司业绩失真;ESO本身有扭曲股价、助长市场泡沫、加剧股市波动的倾向。这些问题的根源在于,ESO下经理人报酬对公司股价的过度依赖,从而助长了经理人的造假行为、且滋生"合谋"行为,以及使公司责任人"虚置"。要完善ESO,有待于减轻经理人报酬对公司股价的过度依赖,建立公司内部约束机制,加大造假成本,完善会计制度,加强审计工作的独立性,加强法律监督,建立内部约束机制。The incentive function of ESO is being affirmed,but the problems remain.The executives' rewards have been divorced from the company performances,which have been distorted in the accounting.The system itself is increasing the fluctuation of the stock market.The causes of the problems are that the executives'rewards relies on the stock price too much and fosters the dishonesty and the conspiracy of executives.In order to perfect the ESO,the mechanism of internal restraint in the company must be formed,through which the dependence of the executives' reward on the stock price will be weakened.In addition,we must increase the cost of the dishonesty,perfect the standards of accounting and the independence of the audit,strengthen the supervision of the law.

关 键 词：经理股票期权计划 ESO 企业 长期激励制度 美国 公司业绩 员工 股价 收入 股票市场 

分 类 号：F830.91[经济管理—金融学]