公司治理机制对总经理报酬影响之实证研究  

An Empirical Study on Corporate Governance for CEO'S Payment Mechanism in Chinese Listed Corporations

作　　者：杜俊涛[1] 颜霜[2] 林武[3] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]成都理工大学商学院,四川成都610051 [3]重庆交通学院财经系,重庆400074

出　　处：《商业研究》2004年第9期56-58,共3页Commercial Research

摘　　要：委托———代理理论对经营者报酬问题的研究 ,着重于董事会作用下的报酬机制。在不设立专门的报酬委员会时 ,董事会决定报酬的行为事实上依赖于公司所有权结构。所以具体的报酬方案是经营者与治理因素博弈的结果。通过公司治理因素与总经理报酬关系的实证研究 ,探求我国上市公司治理机制对总经理报酬的解释力。In the theory of Principal and Agent, the research on the payment of operators focuses on the payment incentive mechanism for CEO's decided by the board. The board decides the payment for CEO's, which relies on the ownership of the corporation. So, the scheme of payment is the result of the game between operators and governance determinants. This paper analyzes the relationship between governance determinants and the payment for CEO's, and probes into how corporate governance mechanism influences the CEO's payment in listed corporations.

关 键 词：中国 上市公司 公司治理机制 总经理 证券市场 委托-代理关系 持股比例 报酬激励机制 股权结构 

分 类 号：F279.246[经济管理—企业管理] F272.91[经济管理—国民经济]