浅析物理主义对于知识论证的反驳——从物理知识概念角度出发  

A Brief Analysis of Physicism’s Refutation of Knowledge Argumentation—From the Perspective of Physical Knowledge Concepts

作　　者：董佳怡 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学人文学院哲学系,上海

出　　处：《哲学进展》2024年第10期2828-2832,共5页Advances in Philosophy

摘　　要：知识论证的核心问题是“知识是否可以被完全转化为物理知识”,对此物理主义者斯图加和刘易斯对知识论证中的知识进行了重新定义和划分,将玛丽获得的新知识归为“经验知识”。本文通过总结两位物理主义者的观点,找出物理主义与知识论证之间的共通点与可调和之处。The core issue of the knowledge argument is whether knowledge can be fully reduced to physical knowledge. In response to this, physicalists Stugaard and Lewis have redefined and categorized knowledge in the context of the knowledge argument, classifying Mary’s new knowledge as “experiential knowledge”. This paper summarizes the views of these two physicalists to identify the points of convergence and reconciliation between physicalism and the knowledge argument.

关 键 词：知识论证 物理主义 黑白玛丽 

分 类 号：G63[文化科学—教育学]