上市公司高管薪酬披露制度研究——基于利益相关者视角  

A Study of Disclosure of Executives’ Remuneration in Listed Companies Based on the Stakeholder Perspective

作　　者：石伟[1] 钱思 徐永妹 

机构地区：[1]中国人民大学劳动人事学院,北京

出　　处：《管理科学与工程》2020年第2期122-130,共9页Management Science and Engineering

摘　　要：以唐纳森和普雷斯顿归纳的利益相关者理论的三种研究方法为框架,阐述上市公司高管薪酬披露的描述性､工具性及规范性正当理由。以2018年沪深A股2827个样本上市公司为研究对象,对目前我国上市公司高管薪酬自愿性披露现状进行编码和统计分析。研究发现,总体而言,我国上市公司高管薪酬与考核委员会并未发挥有效监督作用,高管薪酬确定依据不清晰,缺少高管薪酬与公司业绩敏感性关联的披露信息,在职消费信息披露过于笼统。在此基础上提出对高管薪酬披露的制度建议,为我国上市公司高管薪酬披露的监管实践提供一定指导意义。Based on the Donaldson and Preston’s research methods framework of stakeholder theory, we elaborate the descriptive, instrumental and normative justification of the disclosure of the executive’s compensation of listed companies. Based on 2018 data of Chinese A-Share listed companies, we make a statistical analysis of the current situation of voluntary disclosure of executive compensation of listed companies in China. Results show that the Remuneration Committee of listed companies in China fails to play an effective supervisory role, the basis for determining executive compensation is not clear, the lack of the link disclosure information between executive compensation and sensitivity of company performance, and the lack of detailed disclosure of perquisite consumption. We then put forward suggestions on the system of executive’s compensation disclosure.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 利益相关者 自愿性披露 正当理由 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]