CEO薪酬激励与企业绩效的关系研究  

Research on the Relationship between CEO Compensation Incentives and Corporate Performance

作　　者：尤梦娜 

机构地区：[1]上海工程技术大学管理学院,上海

出　　处：《运筹与模糊学》2023年第6期7114-7122,共9页Operations Research and Fuzziology

摘　　要：企业作为营利性组织,往往更加关注企业的经济目标,企业绩效更是董事会关注的重点以及利益追求,为了实现企业的经济目标,董事会往往会对高管采取激励措施来提升企业绩效,而CEO作为高层管理者的典型代表,对于企业决策和企业绩效起着重要作用。基于此,本文选取2010~2021年我国上市公司的数据,分析了CEO薪酬激励与企业绩效之间的影响机制,研究结果表明:CEO薪酬与企业绩效存在倒“U”型关系,即一定时间范围内,随着CEO薪酬的增加,企业绩效会显著提升,但当CEO薪酬增加到一定程度后,会逐渐削弱企业的绩效。丰富了现有对于企业绩效理论框架的研究,同时在股东对员工执行的相关激励措施具有一定的现实意义。As profit-oriented organizations, enterprises often pay more attention to their economic goals, and corporate performance is a key concern and interest pursuit of the board of directors. In order to achieve the economic goals of the enterprise, the board of directors often adopts incentive measures to enhance corporate performance. As a typical representative of senior executives, the CEO plays an important role in corporate decision-making and performance. Based on this, this paper selects data from listed companies in China from 2010 to 2021 to analyze the influence mechanism between CEO compensation incentives and corporate performance. The research results show that there is an inverted “U” relationship between CEO compensation and corporate performance, that is, within a certain range of time, as CEO compensation increases, corporate performance will significantly improve. However, when CEO compensation increases to a certain extent, it will gradually weaken the performance of the enterprise. This enriches the existing research on the theoretical framework of corporate performance and has certain practical significance in terms of incentives implemented by shareholders for employees.

关 键 词：CEO薪酬 企业绩效 上市公司 

分 类 号：F27[经济管理—企业管理]