基于测算法下经营者努力程度与企业经营业绩敏感度分析  

Positive Analysis of Sensitivity between Executive's Effort and Performance ——Based on Reckoning Method

作　　者：范慧慧[1] 

机构地区：[1]江苏大学工商管理学院,江苏镇江212013

出　　处：《财会通讯（学术版）》2007年第12期55-57,共3页Communication of Finance and Accounting

摘　　要：由于经营者努力程度无法直接观察,需要寻找可观测到的变量进行近似替代。根据契约理论和激励理论,可采用经营者报酬来衡量其努力程度。本文对经营者报酬业绩敏感度的研究采用逆向思维方式,研究了经营者报酬变化对企业经营业绩变化的影响程度,以经济学中"弹性"为依据命名了测算法,指出了经营者报酬变化的最优适度区间,以期为企业提高经营业绩提供参考。Although the executive s effort isn t able to be observed directly, we have to find another visual variety which will replace it. According to contract theory and incentive theory, it can be measured as executive s payment. The paper makes breakthrough on executive payment-to-performance sensitivity. The author names a new method to measure executive payment-to-performance sensitivity as reckoning method, which is based on elasticity in the economics. At the same time, the paper researches the executive pay...

关 键 词：经营者努力程度 报酬业绩敏感度 测算法 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]