企业劳动契约的激励模型分析——一种发生在道德风险之前的逆向选择问题  

The Principal-agent Model Analysis of Labor Contracts in Enterprises ——An Adverse Selection Problem Occurring before Moral Hazard

作　　者：张如凯[1] 赵曙明[1] 肖剑科[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《管理科学》2005年第1期26-30,共5页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目 (70372036)

摘　　要：分析了企业劳动契约的制定过程以及企业和员工之间的委托代理关系,企业在制定劳动契约时会面临发生在道德风险之前的逆向选择问题,将其与企业的人力资源管理实践相结合构造出相关模型,对这一委托代理模型的激励约束进行分析,认为企业作为委托人,在制定劳动契约时应该综合考虑代理人 (员工 )的外在机会效用水平、内生成本函数、效用偏好函数和努力水平等激励影响因素。The paper analyzed the establishment of labor contracts in enterprises and set up a principal-agent model between the principal (enterprise) and the agent (employee). The author found there are adverse selection and moral hazard in labor contracts. And adverse selection occurs before moral hazard. After the discussion of the model constraints, it′s concluded that the principal (enterprise) should consider synthetically external factors, the agent's endogenous cost function and effort level to establish labor contracts.

关 键 词：委托人 代理人 约束 激励 契约 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]