声誉激励机制扭曲下国企经理人的行为选择  

The Choice of Managerial Behavior in State-owned Enterprises Under the Distorted Credit Incentive Mechanism

作　　者：周梦顺[1] 张红波[2] 

机构地区：[1]湖南工业职业技术学院财务处,湖南长沙410208 [2]湖南科技大学工业工程系,湖南湘潭411201

出　　处：《商业研究》2006年第17期82-84,共3页Commercial Research

摘　　要：声誉作为“隐性激励”对“显性激励”的替代作用,考虑国企存在声誉激励机制的扭曲,有必要建立国企经理人的声誉模型,重点研究了声誉激励机制扭曲下国企经理人的行为选择问题,研究结果表明,国企经理人更容易采取机会主义行为,从而导致生产效率低下、经营业绩不佳。The paper studies the function of credit as implicit incentives substitute to explicit incentives. A model is set up under the distored credit incentive mechanism in state - owned enterprises, which focuses on the choice of managerial behavior. The finds show managers in the state -owned enterprises can adopt the opportunism behavior easily which results in the lower production efficiency and worse management performance.

关 键 词：声誉 激励机制 扭曲 行为选择 

分 类 号：F272.91[经济管理—企业管理]