团队协作最优激励模型分析  

Analysis of Optimal Incentive Model for Team Cooperation

作　　者：王艳梅[1] 赵希男[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,辽宁沈阳110004

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2007年第9期1346-1349,共4页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家高技术研究发展计划项目(863-9803-05)

摘　　要：通过构建包括一个委托人两个代理人的团队生产委托代理模型研究了激励结构与团队协作之间的关系.考虑代理人除自身工作之外还可以选择帮助同伴的情形,假定委托人提供基于个体及团队两层次产出的激励方案,首先得出了代理人关于自身努力及协作水平的均衡选择并进行了相关分析,然后得出了委托人最优的激励系数设置.分别就代理人关于自身努力及帮助努力相互独立及相互替代两种情形下代理人及委托人的最佳选择进行了分析.The relation between incentive structure and team cooperation is studied by developing a principal-agent model for team production, including a principal and two agents. It is supposed that the team member can help his fellow and an incentive scheme drawn up by the principal is based on both individual and team output. In the scheme how an agent chooses the equilibrium between his own effort to fulfill his task and collaborative effort he is available is expressed with a correlation analysis. Then, the way the principal shall set the optimal incentive parameters is given, and how the principal and agents make their choices in case the agents＇ own effort and his collaborative effort are either mutually independent or mutually substitutive are analyzed.

关 键 词：团队 协作 激励 委托-代理 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]