渠道权力结构与进场费的作用关系——基于中国家电渠道的案例研究  

Relationship between Channel Power Structure and Slotting Allowances——Case Study of Chinese Household Electrical Appliances Channels

作　　者：董春艳[1] 张闯[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学工商管理学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2007年第10期119-126,共8页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目"渠道依赖;权力结构与策略:社会网络视角的研究"(批准号06JC630005)

摘　　要：本研究以渠道权力理论为切入点,以国美电器和正阳家电的进场费实践为例,对渠道权力结构与进场费之间的作用关系进行了初步的实证研究,研究表明:在零售商处于权力优势的渠道中,零售商的权力优势越显著,进场费额度越高;在制造商处于权力优势的渠道中,不存在进场费;权力高度均衡的渠道中,存在进场费,但额度较低。此外,进场费也可通过影响渠道绩效而间接地作用于满意度,进而影响渠道关系稳定性。Based on channel power theories, the authors take Gome and the Zhengyang Electronic Appliances Company as samples to conduct an empirical study of the relationships between channel power structure and slotting allowances. It is found that if retailers are in power advantage in a channel of asymmetrical power structure, the more advantageous, the higher slotting allowances; on the contrary, if manufactures are in power advantage, slotting allowances don＇t exist. Moreover, in a channel of symmetrical power structure, in which retailers and manufactures highly depend on each other, slotting allowances are the lowest. At last, slotting allowances also have an indirect effect on the stability of channel relations by influencing the conducts of channel performance and satisfaction.

关 键 词：进场费 渠道权力结构 渠道绩效 满意 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]