基于工作设计的知识型员工激励机制研究  

Research on incentive mechanism of knowledge workers based on job design

作　　者：王文平[1] 邓玉林[1] 

机构地区：[1]东南大学经济管理学院,江苏南京210096

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2008年第1期81-86,共6页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70571013);国家社会科学基金(05CJY004);教育部新世纪人才支持计划资助项目(NECT-06-0471)

摘　　要：在分析知识型员工工作偏好的基础上,结合工作的内在激励效用设计了其效用函数,利用委托代理框架,分析了知识型员工挑战性工作激励与金钱激励的相互作用关系.结果表明,无论信息完全与否,挑战性工作均能在一定意义上替代金钱对知识型员工的激励作用;信息不完全时,挑战性工作还能够增强知识型员工抵抗报酬风险的能力.最后给出了实证分析,并得出了知识型员工挑战性工作的设计原则与方法.Based on the analysis of the job preference of knowledge workers, a utility function incorporating intrinsic incentive effect is designed. Then, applying the principal-agent model of incentive mechanism the relationship between challenging job incentive and monetary incentive is studied. The results show that challenging job can be used to substitute for monetary incentive effect for knowledge workers whether information is complete or not. On the other hand, when the information is incomplete, the challenging job can enhance the ability of resisting reward risk for knowledge workers. Finally, a case analysis is given and the principle and approach of designing the challenging job of knowledge workers are obtained.

关 键 词：激励机制 知识型员工 工作设计 挑战性工作 金钱激励 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]