高管持股、高管的私有收益与公司的并购行为  

Executive Equity-Based Compensation,Executive Private Benefits and Corporate M&As

作　　者：李善民[1] 毛雅娟[1,2] 赵晶晶[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院,广州510275 [2]华南农业大学经济管理学院,广州510642

出　　处：《管理科学》2009年第6期2-12,共11页Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(70572054);教育部人文社会科学研究一般项目(青年)~~

摘　　要：探讨公司高管发动的并购行为与谋取个人私有收益行为之间的关联性,并尝试从高级管理层的私有收益角度对公司高管的并购行为进行研究。基于代理成本理论及中国高管薪酬管制和公司并购的特殊制度背景,以1999年～2007年全部A股上市公司为样本,采用固定效应回归、随机效应回归和分层回归的实证方法,得到一些重要结论。实证结果表明,中国上市公司并购已经成为高管谋取私有收益的机会主义行为,通过发动并购行动高管获得更高的薪酬和在职消费,而高管发动并购事件谋求在职消费的私有收益动机最为明显。通过分层回归还发现,目前中国的制度环境下管理者持股水平虽然相对较低,但这一股权激励的确能够适当缓解高管以谋取私有收益为目的而发动毁损股东价值的并购行为。This paper aims to investigate the association between executive private benefits and acquiring managers＇ M＆A decisions and attempts to shed new light on the causes and consequences of corporate M＆As from a fresh angle of executive private benefits. Considering Chna＇s regulation on executive compensation and special institutional features of corporate M＆As, the study investigates data from all China＇s listed companies over 1999 to 2007 based on Agency Theory. With the analysis of data by fixed effects regressions, random effects regressions and hierarchical regressions, we find significant empirical evidence. The results indicate that corporate executives launch M＆A deals for their opportunistic incentives of private benefits, and their pecuniary compensation and especially non-pecuniary compensation significantly increases following M＆As. By using hierarchical regressions, the paper also finds that equity-based compensation can partially alleviate executives＇ incentives to pursue private benefits via value-destroying M＆As even if the equity-based compensation is averagely low under current institutional environment.

关 键 词：并购 高管持股 私有收益 高管薪酬 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]