高管薪酬、激励与公司业绩关系研究述评  

Executive Compensation,Incentive and Performance:A Literature Review

作　　者：赵青华[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]西南交通大学经济管理学院,成都610031 [2]重庆工商大学会计学院,重庆400067

出　　处：《重庆工商大学学报（西部论坛）》2010年第1期101-108,共8页Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University:West Forum

摘　　要：关于公司业绩与高管薪酬的关系,很难用一个简单的线性关系来解答。无论是委托代理理论、信号理论、激励理论,还是契约理论,都有诸多的假设前提;而利用上市公司数据的实证研究结论又依赖于数据样本、计量方法以及公司薪酬、业绩等代理变量;因而,无论是实证研究还是理论模型研究,对公司业绩与高管薪酬的关系都未有定论。在研究我国公司高管激励问题时,还应将经济制度、法制乃至人文环境加入激励模型。The relationship between the executive compensation and the performance of the corporation is difficult to be answered by a linear relation. Trust-agent theory, signal theory, incentive theory and contract theory have many conjectures and premises, however, the empirical research conclusion by using the data of listed companies depends on data examples, calculating method and variables of corporate pay and performance, thus, whether empirical conclusion or theoretical models have no certainty on the relation between corporate performance and CEO pay. Research into China＇s CEO incentive should add economic institution, law and humanistic environment to incentive models.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 公司业绩 薪酬形式 委托代理理论 激励理论 契约理论 信号理论 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]