锦标赛理论研究综述  

The Review of Studies on Tournament Theory

作　　者：闫威[1] 杨金兰[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2010年第8期135-138,150,共5页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70772100);教育部博士点基金项目(教技发中心函(2006)226号)

摘　　要：锦标赛理论是通过比较相对业绩来研究委托代理关系的一种激励机制理论。它可以减少各种不确定因素的影响,降低监督成本并提高绩效产出。文章从理论研究、实证检验和相关应用三方面对锦标机制的研究现状进行了概括总结,首先从与传统合约理论的比较、锦标机制的设计以及团队锦标赛三方面分析了锦标机制的基础理论与发展;然后概括了基于上述假设的实证检验;最后分析了锦标机制在其他领域的应用现状。虽然锦标机制是一种有效的激励机制,但仍有其不足之处,有待于进一步的发展与完善。Tournament theory is a theory of incentive mechanism in the principal-agent relationship which is based on the comparison of individual relative performance.It can reduce the impact of the uncertainty,reducing monitoring costs as well as improving outputs.This paper summarizes the research status on tournament scheme in three aspects： theoretical research,experimental study and related applications.At first,the paper introduces basic tournament theory and the development of the model by comparing it with the traditional theory,discussing mechanism design and analyzing team tournament;then we review relevant empirical testing which are based on the above assumptions;finally we summarize the application status of the tournament scheme in other related areas.As a whole the tournament scheme is an effective incentive mechanism,but there are still several shortcomings which remain to be further studied and improved.

关 键 词：锦标机制 薪酬差距 研究综述 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]