股权流通性改善对高管激励机制的影响——来自中国股权分置改革前后高管薪酬的证据  

Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Split-share Structure Reform on the Executive Compensation

作　　者：张奇峰[1] 丁苏丽 

机构地区：[1]上海立信会计学院,上海201620 [2]上海延华智能科技股份有限公司,上海200060

出　　处：《经济管理》2011年第3期142-149,共8页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：上海市教委重点项目"政企关系;代理冲突与投资者保护"(11ZS186)上海市教委重点学科"会计与治理"(J51701)与上海立信会计学院会计研究院项目"大股东控制下高管层薪酬制度研究"(09KJYJ06);教育部人文社科项目"股改后审计市场结构的演变及其监控研究"(08JA790084);上海市曙光计划项目"后股改时代的证券审计市场结构:成因;后果与监管"(07SG55)

摘　　要：以往对股改前上市公司的研究表明,高管薪酬与公司业绩不相关或相关度不高。通过对比股权分置改革前后高管薪酬的情况,本文实证分析了股权分置改革对高管激励机制的影响。我们发现,与股改前相比,上市公司高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性显著提高;与未股改公司相比,股改公司高管薪酬与业绩的敏感性更高。本文论证了股权流通性改善对于完善高管薪酬激励制度的积极意义,为全面评估股权分置改革与理解高管薪酬的制度约束提供了经验证据。Prior studies on the listed firms before the split-share structure reforme find that the relation between executive compensation and performce is week. This paper analyzes the impact of Split-share Structure Reform on the executive compensation contract. We find that firstly, compared with that of listed firms before split-share structure reform, the relation between executive compensation and performce in the listed firms after split-share structure reform is stronger. Secondly, compared with that of listed firms with split-share structure, the relation between executive compensation and performce in the listed firms without split-share structure is stronger. We document the role of Split-share Structure Reform to improve the management incentive system. These evidences benefit both our assessment of the impact of Split-share Structure Reform and our understanding the institutional constraits of management incentive system.

关 键 词：股权分置改革 高管薪酬 薪酬业绩敏感性 

分 类 号：F276.6[经济管理—企业管理]