管理者声誉机制、讨好机制对相关主体利益影响研究  

Do Managers’ Reputation and Biasing Shareholders Affect the Benefit of Relevant Stakeholders？

作　　者：郑石桥[1] 付彪[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京审计学院国际审计学院 [2]新疆财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《中大管理研究》2011年第1期57-79,共23页China Management Studies

摘　　要：在两权分离的企业,管理者收益分配决策的基本问题就是如何将可分配收益在员工和投资者之间进行分割。影响管理者做出这种分割决策的因素是声誉机制和讨好投资者。本文研究的问题是,声誉机制是否只对员工有利呢？讨好机制能否真的给投资者和管理者带来好处呢？在多期博弈背景下,本文采用实验方法收集数据进行统计分析发现,管理者建立声誉机制和不单方面讨好投资者,能带来合作博弈,从而对企业整体利益、投资者利益、员工利益和管理者利益都能带来好处;而只是讨好投资者,不顾及员工利益,其结果只能是非合作博弈,对相关利益各方都没有好处,甚至对讨好对象（投资者）都没有好处。Due to the separation of ownership and operation, managers must decide income distribution among shareholders and employees, then managers’ reputation and biasing shareholders may affect this decision. Does managers’ reputation just produce benefit to employee？ Does managers’ biasing shareholders really increase the benefit of shareholders？ Based on the multi- period experimental data, this paper finds that, managers’ reputation and no-biasing shareholders can produce benefits to shareholders, employees and managers’ themself, and managers’ biasing shareholders without reputation can damage the benefits of shareholders, employees and managers themself.

关 键 词：声誉机制 讨好机制 动态博弈 企业收益分配 隐性合约 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]