演化博弈下企业知识员工隐性知识转化决策  

Tacit Knowledge Conversion Decision of Enterprise′s Knowledge Worker under Evolutionary Game

作　　者：余祖德[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国石油大学(北京)工商管理学院,北京102249

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（信息与管理工程版）》2011年第3期497-500,共4页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology：Information & Management Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70572103);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金资助项目(10YJC630363)

摘　　要：针对隐性知识的内隐性、未编码化等特征,指出为使其适用范围扩大,必须使其显性化。认为在企业内部,知识员工隐性知识转化涉及到两个问题:一是高知识员工群体和低知识员工群体对知识转化的态度不同;二是他们本身知识水平的差异导致转化能力的差异。为解决企业内部的知识转化问题,提出了采用演化博弈的复制动态方程的方法来确定知识转化的决策条件。Tacit knowledge is implicit and uncoded.It should be explicit to widen its applicable scope.Conversion of the knowledge worker′s tacit knowledge involves two questions within enterprise.One is that the attitude of high knowledge worker colony is different from that of low knowledge worker colony;the other is that the difference of their knowledge level leads to different conversion abilities.In order to solve the questions of knowledge conversion,the replicated dynamic equations of evolution game theory was adopted to create the conditions of knowledge conversion decision.

关 键 词：隐性知识 知识转化 决策条件 知识员工 复制动态方程 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]