公司经营者物质报酬、政治激励与经营绩效——基于国有控股上市公司的实证分析  

Compensation,Political Incentive of Top Management and Corporate Performance:Evidences from State Holding Listed Companies

作　　者：宋增基[1] 郭桂玺[1] 张宗益[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2011年第4期99-104,128,共6页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家杰出青年基金项目"企业理论"(项目编号:70525005)的资助

摘　　要：本文选取中国国有上市公司为研究对象,重点研究国有上市公司经营者激励与公司绩效的相关性,并研究经营者升迁的决定因素对公司绩效的敏感性。研究发现在国有控股的企业中,董事长更多的关注政治激励,总经理更多的关心物质激励,当存在晋升机会时,政治激励、物质激励有一定的替代关系;年轻管理者的对公司绩效的作用往往主观地被低估,任期、政治关联、学历同晋升机会、公司绩效显著正相关,这意味着,上级对高级管理人员经营能力的判断时,应剔除高级管理人员个人特性对公司绩效的影响。This paper uses China's state-controlled listed companies as samples and focuses on the relevance of corporate performance and top management incentives and the impact of top management incentives on corporate performance.Besides,we study the sensitivity between the determinants of promotion and corporate performance.We find that in state-controlled listed companies,chairmen are more concerned about political motivation,and general managers are more concerned about material incentives.In case of promotion opportunities,political incentives and material incentives can be substituting.And younger managers' role in the company is often underestimated.Service term,political connections and diploma are positively correlated with promotion opportunities and corporate performance.

关 键 词：经营者报酬 政治激励 公司绩效 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] F224[经济管理—国民经济]