信仰命题的证真——从维特根斯坦语言哲学思想考察女娲信仰的生成  

Verification of Belief——The Birth of Belief in Nuwa in the Perspective of Linguistic Philosophy by Wittgenstein

作　　者：韩力扬[1] 

机构地区：[1]河北工程大学文学院,河北邯郸056038

出　　处：《河北学刊》2011年第5期226-229,共4页Hebei Academic Journal

摘　　要：女娲信仰命题,在维特根斯坦的语言哲学思想看来,是神秘的不可说部分,但是信仰自有其言说的独特方式。可以把女娲信仰命题分为可说与不可说两部分,可说部分用语言以"摹画"的方式表达清楚;不可说部分以"显示"的方式呈现自身,后者对于女娲信仰命题的证真起到了决定性作用。因为信仰命题证真的关键在于信徒的迷狂的心理体验,并以此实现与女娲融为一体的愿望,不可说部分的"显示"恰恰达到了这样的效果。According to Wittgenstein＇ s philosophy of languagea, the proposition Of Ntiwa belief seems mysterious and is unspeakabilit; however, faith itself has its own particular way of saying. The proposition of Ntiwa belief can be divided into two parts, i.e. speakability and unspeakability. Speakability can be clearly expressed by language in form of abbildung while unspeakability presents itself in form of gezeigt. Unspeakability plays a crucial role in the confirmation bias of the proposition of Nuwa belief. The key of confirmation bias of a proposition of belief lies in believers＇crazy psychological experience which enables the realization of the desire of mixing together with Nuwa. The form of gezeigt in unspeakability has exactly such effect.

关 键 词：女娲信仰命题 维特根斯坦 可说 不可说 

分 类 号：B089[哲学宗教—哲学理论]