我思:主体及其处境——从笛卡尔到梅洛-庞蒂  

Subject of Cogito and Its Situations:From Descartes to Merleau-Ponty

作　　者：徐晟[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江工商大学哲学系

出　　处：《社会科学》2011年第9期131-137,共7页Journal of Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社科基金项目"现象学在二十世纪法国哲学中的主导地位研究"(项目编号:08BZX047)的阶段性成果

摘　　要：笛卡尔一方面强调思想主体,我思自我的单纯性,也就是无广延、非时间的特征,使之可以脱离身体而单独存在;另一方面,在论述身体之实存以及感觉功能时,又对身体的认知功能有所承认。梅洛-庞蒂对"我思(cogito)"阐释不仅否认了单纯思维主体的永恒性、将我思重新揭示为一个时空中的事件,还由此勾勒出一个更为贴切的主体形象。On the one hand, Descartes insists that the thinking subject is not only without extension but in - temporal, and it can be even without body. On the other, when discussing the existence of body and the function of sense, he can＇ t deny that they do have some kind of ability of cognition or even thinking. Merleau - Ponty＇ s critique on cogito denounces that in - temporality by laying the subject back to its proper status, describes the cogito as an event. In the meantime, this new interpretation has provided the subject a proper figure.

关 键 词：笛卡尔 我思 梅洛-庞蒂 

分 类 号：B505[哲学宗教—外国哲学]