管理决断权、高管薪酬与企业绩效的实证研究  

Empirical Study on Managerial Discretion,CEO Compensation and Firm Performance

作　　者：高遐[1] 井润田[1] 万媛媛[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,成都610054

出　　处：《管理评论》2012年第4期107-114,共8页Management Review

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费项目(E022050205);高校博士点基金项目(20090185110001)

摘　　要：本文从企业层面上研究了管理决断权对高管薪酬的影响及两者与企业绩效之间的权变关系。论文选取2002-2007年深沪两市上市公司作为研究样本,构建了管理决断权的多指标衡量体系,证明管理决断权对高管薪酬和企业绩效具有重要的决定作用,企业绩效好的情况下高管薪酬与管理决断权的联系更为紧密。同样,在高管理决断权情况下高管薪酬与企业绩效的挂钩更加紧密,但同时企业会面临监管难题。The impact of managerial discretion upon CEO compensation and their relation with firm performance is studied in this paper.Based on the samples from the listed companies on Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges,a multi-dimension-measurement model of discretion is established,which is proved to have important impact upon compensation and performance.Furthermore,it is found that compensation would have closer relation with discretion under better performance,and compensation will have closer relation with performance under high discretion.Then,a regulation dilemma is also pointed out.

关 键 词：管理决断权 高管薪酬 企业绩效 边际生产力 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]