管理者薪酬、在职消费与公司绩效——基于合作博弈的分析视角  

Executive Compensation,Perks and Performance——An Analysis Based on Cooperative Game Theory

作　　者：冯根福[1] 赵珏航[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2012年第6期147-158,共12页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学规划项目"基于内部治理视角的公司技术创新研究"(批准号09yja790162);西安交通大学-苏州国发创投金融投资研究所资助项目

摘　　要：在我国公司管理者的薪酬激励体系中,年薪、股权激励和在职消费是三个重要组成部分,系统地研究这三个组成部分之间的关系及其对公司绩效影响,对于建立有效的管理者薪酬激励制度和完善公司治理具有重要意义。本文从合作博弈的角度出发,在非对称Nash讨价还价模型的基础上,通过引入内生化的讨价还价力,构建了一个内生化的Nash讨价还价模型,并应用此模型系统地分析了管理者年薪、股权激励与在职消费之间的关系。本文理论模型分析表明:在给定年薪的情况下,管理者持股比例与在职消费之间存在替代关系。本文运用2005—2010年沪深两市A股上市公司面板数据对上述分析结果以及管理者年薪、股权激励、在职消费与公司绩效之间关系进行了实证分析,结果发现:管理者持股比例和在职消费之间存在替代关系,管理者持股比例的增加能够抑制在职消费,从而提高公司绩效。Executive compensation,equity incentive and perks are three important parts of management incentive system of Chinese corporation. It is meaningful to systematically research the relationship among these factors and the effectiveness to corporate performance. From a perspective of cooperative game theory, this research establishes an asymmetric Nash bargaining model with endogenous bargaining power and analyses the relationship of different parts of executive compensation, which include annual salary, equity share and perk. According to this framework, there is a substitute relationship between equity share and perk when annual salary is given. And such relationship is verified by the empirical analysis based on the data of listed corporation on the stock market of Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2005 to 2010. Furthermore, this paper examined the relationship among annual salary, equity share and perk and firm performance. Finally, we conclude that increasing executive equity share could enhance corporate performance by reducing executive perks.

关 键 词：管理者薪酬 在职消费 股权激励 公司绩效 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]