上市公司公允价值计量与高管薪酬激励研究  

A Study of Fair Value Measurement and Executive Compensation Incentives in Listed Companies

作　　者：周晖[1] 杨静[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,湖南长沙410082

出　　处：《当代财经》2012年第8期72-81,共10页Contemporary Finance and Economics

摘　　要：新会计准则实施背景下,公允价值信息成为高管薪酬考评中不容忽视的新因素。以利润表中的"公允价值变动损益"作为公允价值的替代变量,研究我国上市公司公允价值计量对高管薪酬的影响。实证结果表明,公允价值变动收益(损失)与高管薪酬显著正相关(不相关);不同产权性质企业的公允价值变动损益对高管薪酬存在差异影响;公允价值变动损益对企业整体高管薪酬业绩敏感性影响不显著,我国上市公司高管薪酬激励机制有待完善。In the context of the implementation of the new accounting standards, the fair value informa- tion has become a new factor that cannot be ignored during the executive compensative evaluation. This paper studies the influence of fair value measurement of China＇s listed companies on the executive com-pensation by taking the ＂changes in fair value loss and profit＂ in the profit statement as an alternative variable of fair value. The empirical test results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the fair value gains and the executive compensation, while the fair value losses have no obvious effect on the executive compensation. The changes in the fair value loss and profit of the companies with different property fights have a disparate impact on the executive compensation. The changes in the fair value loss and profit have no striking influence on the sensitivity of the performance-related executive compensation of the whole company. This study indicates that the executive compensation incentive mechanism of China＇s listed companies remains to be improved.

关 键 词：公允价值 高管薪酬 薪酬业绩敏感性 

分 类 号：F272.923[经济管理—企业管理]