公平偏好、高管团队锦标激励与企业绩效  

The Fairness Preference,the Incentives of the Executive Team Championship and Firm Performance

作　　者：黄邦根[1] 

机构地区：[1]安徽财经大学经济学院,安徽蚌埠233030

出　　处：《商业经济与管理》2012年第11期62-70,共9页Journal of Business Economics

基　　金：安徽省教育厅人文社科重点研究基地项目"承接产业转移影响安徽产业结构调整的机理研究"(SK2012B592)

摘　　要：文章基于企业高管团队成员具有公平偏好假设,构建公平偏好下高管团队锦标激励对企业绩效影响的理论模型,通过模型推导与分析,得到高管团队公平偏好强度、高管团队薪酬差距与企业绩效之间存在以下关系:高管公平偏好强度越大则企业绩效越差,即高管的公平偏好降低了高管的均衡努力水平,同时引发企业提高锦标竞赛失败者获得的低薪酬,从而企业绩效将随高管公平偏好强度的增加而降低;高管团队薪酬差距和企业绩效之间关系呈现倒"U"型,即当高管薪酬差距不大时,扩大薪酬差距将增加企业绩效,当高管薪酬差距超过一定值后,薪酬差距的扩大则企业绩效减少。Based on the hypothesis that the member of the corporate executive team has fairness preference, this article builds a theoretical model of the incentives of the executive team championship on firm performance under equity preference. Through the model derivation and analysis, we find the following relationship between the equity preference strength, the pay gap and the performance： the greater the intensity of executives equity preference, the worse the business performance, that is, the executive equity preference reduces his equilibrium level effort, at the same time leads to the enterprise to improve their low pay of championship contest losers, so business performance will decrease with the increase of the strength of executive equity preference; the relationship between the pay gap and business performance is an inverted ＂ U＂ shape, which means when the executive pay gap is small, expanding the pay gap will increase corporate earnings, when executive pay gap exceeds a certain value, expanding the pay gap will decrease corporate earnings.

关 键 词：公平偏好 高管团队 锦标激励 企业绩效 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]