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机构地区:[1]吉林农业大学经济管理学院,长春130118 [2]吉林大学管理学院,长春130022
出 处:《商业研究》2013年第1期41-46,共6页Commercial Research
摘 要:电信产业是典型的寡头垄断产业,有足够的市场事实可以证明电信运营商之间易出现合谋行为。本文引入垂直产品差异化变量,研究垂直差异化下电信运营商间合谋行为的机理。当电信运营商之间产品的垂直差异化水平达到一定程度时,运营商间维持合谋所需的贴现因子水平小于产品同质时的贴现因子水平,并且随着差异化程度的增加,维持合谋所需贴现因子水平逐渐降低,说明垂直产品差异化有利于合谋的实现和维持。但是,对于提供不同质量产品的运营商,维持合谋的激励程度不同,提供高质量产品的运营商更容易背叛合谋。Telecommunication industry is a typical oligopolistic industry.There is sufficient evidence to prove collusion between telecom operators.This paper introduced a variable of vertical product differentiation to study the mechanism of collusion of telecom operators.The value of discount factor to contain the collusion under the vertical product differentiation is smaller than the value of discount factor under the product homogeneity.And with the increase of the degree of differentiation,the value of discount factor is lower.It means that it is easier to collude under the vertical product differentiation.But,the discount factor of the telecom operator with higher product quality is more than the telecom operator with lower product quality.So,it is easier to betray the collusion to the telecom operator with higher product quality.
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