考虑心理偏好的经营者激励机制研究  

Research on Executive's Incentive Mechanism Considering Psychological Preference

作　　者：罗彪[1] 朱晓梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2013年第2期111-116,共6页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71272064)

摘　　要：HM模型是对薪酬契约进行激励机制分析的基本工具,但其立论于"经济人"假设,忽略了个体社会化属性与需求导致的心理效用偏差。考虑经营者"薪酬竞争"和"非物质需求"两类心理偏好构建拓展委托-代理模型,通过数学分析表明:产出分享系数与企业盈利能力、经营者薪酬竞争偏好正相关,与企业非物质激励、经营者非物质需求偏好负相关;两类心理偏好综合影响薪酬契约的激励结构、经营者的努力水平、所有者的代理成本。HM model is the basic tool to analyze incentive mechanism of compensation contract. But it emphasizes on the hypothesis of ＂economic man＂, which neglects people＇s psychological utility for their social attributes and demands. Considering of executive ~s psychological preference of ＂compensation competition＂ and ＂non-material demand＂, the paper constructs an extended principal-agent model. The results show that the output-sharing coefficient is positively correlated with company＇s profitability and executive＇s ＂compensation competition＂ preference,but is negatively correlated with company＇s non-material incentive and executive＇s ＂non-material demand＂ preference. Also, the synthetically affect structure of compensation agency cost. two types of psychological preference would contract, executive＇ s effort level, and owner ＇ s

关 键 词：委托代理 心理偏好 激励机制 代理成本 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]