代理人自利行为下的最优激励契约  

Optimal Incentive Contracts under Agents’ Self-interested Behavior

作　　者：何山[1] 徐光伟[1] 陈泽明[1] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400030

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2013年第3期139-144,155,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71062002);中央高校基本科研业务费重点资助项目(CDJXS11022201)

摘　　要：在线性契约委托代理框架中引入代理人的自利行为,主要从隐藏收益和在职消费两种自利行为视角分析代理人的自利行为对最优激励契约设计的影响。通过理论模型和数值分析发现,代理人隐藏、转移收益自利行为降低了最优激励契约业绩薪酬系数。代理人在职消费自利行为提高了最优激励契约业绩薪酬系数。说明代理人不同自利行为下,委托人提供的最优激励契约是不同的。从代理人的最优努力程度来看,代理人的自利行为不同程度地提高了自身的努力水平。研究表明在当前我国企业薪酬激励制度背景下,代理人的自利行为可能表现为一种自我激励机制。研究结论为我国企业目前薪酬激励扭曲的后果和未来薪酬制度的改革提供了有意义的参考。The optimal contract theory holds that the well-designed compensation contracts can help mitigate agency conflicts caused bythe self-interested behavior of managers. In fact, agents can increase the personal utility not only by reducing the level of effort, but also by transferring corporate resources to their own expenditure. On the one hand, managers can abuse their power to appropriate company resources. In addition, managers can enjoy excessively in-office expense. Is agent＇s self-interested behavior a self-incentived or purely opportunistic behavior？ What is the effect of self-interested behavior on incentive contracts？ Introducing agents＇ self-interested behavior into the linear contract principal-agent framework, this study analyzes the effect of agents＇ self-interested behavior on the optimal incentive contract design from the two perspectives of hidden income and perks. Firstly, this paper introduces agent＇s hidden income behavior and the corresponding cost into the linear contract principal-agent framework. The analysis shows that the greater the real output transferred by the agent, the smaller the coefficient of pay performance sensibility is. When an agent has a self-interested motive, the level of effort will be higher than the normal level. With the help of numerical simulation, we find that if an agent has a self-interested motive, the coefficient of pay performance sensibility will be less than the normal level in the optimal incentive contracts. Thus, the incentive for an agent should be reduced. In addition, an agent with the hidden income behavior improves his/her own effort. Secondly, this paper introduces perks and corporate resource cost into the linear contract principal-agent framework. The analysis shows that when an agent enjoys excessive in-office expense he/she will improve efforts. The greater an agent enjoys in-office expense, the bigger the coefficient of pay performance sensibility is. So the incentive for an agent should be improved. With the help of numerical simul

关 键 词：代理人 自利行为 隐藏收益 在职消费 最优激励契约 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]