教师教育U-S合作的X低效率与委托-代理理论分析  

An Analysis on the X-low-efficiency and Commission-Agent Theory of the U-S Cooperation in Teachers' Education

作　　者：张翔[1] 

机构地区：[1]贵州师范大学,贵州贵阳550001

出　　处：《国家教育行政学院学报》2013年第9期51-54,共4页Journal of National Academy of Education Administration

摘　　要：教师教育U-S合作中客观存在着双重委托-代理关系,这种委托-代理关系大大增加了教师教育U-S合作的委托-代理成本,构成了教师教育U-S合作的X低效率产生的主要根源。建立双重激励约束机制,充分调动中小学管理者和中小学教师参与教师教育的积极性,是降低教师教育U-S合作X低效率的有效途径。There exist education, which has greatly double commission-agent relationships in the U-S cooperation of teachers＇ increased costs of this commission-agent and constituted a major cause of low- efficiency in that. Establishing a double incentive and restraint mechanisms, and fully mobilizing administrators in high and middle schools to participate in teachers＇ education are the effective way of reducing the X-low-efficiency of the U-S cooperation in teachers＇ education.

关 键 词：教师教育 U-S合作 X低效率 委托-代理关系 

分 类 号：G635.1[文化科学—教育学]