团队知识共享行为的随机突变模型及仿真  

A Stochastic Catastrophe Model of Knowledge Sharing Within a Team Including Simulations

作　　者：徐岩[1,2] 胡斌[2] 杨永清[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东工商学院工商管理学院.山东烟台264005 [2]华中科技大学管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2013年第5期240-249,共10页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071065,71101059,71272122,70971124);教育部人文社科项目(12YJA630067);住房和城乡建设部科技计划项目(2010-R3-13)

摘　　要：针对团队成员之间的知识共享行为建立一个演化博弈模型,模型中引入监督机制和奖罚机制,并引入白噪声反应博弈过程所受到的随机干扰。借助随机突变理论研究关于团队激励机制、成员自身素质和成员之间交互作用属性参数的连续变化对动力学演化的离散变化的影响即突变性,找到了团队行为发生突变的临界集合。指出演化过程中出现的双模态,反映了团队知识共享行为对外界扰动的敏感性,突跳反映了对参数连续变化的敏感性,而滞后现象反映了管理决策中保持共享行为比治理不共享行为的可靠性。An evolutionary game model on knowledge sharing within a team is developed, in which oversight mechanism and award mechanism are introduced. The Gaussian White noise is introduced to show the disturbanee in this game. The catastrophe of sharing behavior, emerging from the continuous changes of the parameters about motivation mechanisms, the natures of members and the interactions between them, is analyzed by means of stochastic catastrophe theory（SCT）. The catastrophe set of control variables is found to explain and forecast the catastrophe of strategic alliances. In the evolutionary process, there are several catastrophe characteristics： bimodality that implies the sensitivity to external disturbance; sudden jumps that imply the sensitivity to the con- tinuous changes of the parameters ; hysterisis that reflects the fact that it is more reliable to maintain sharing knowledge than to administer non-sharing knowledge.

关 键 词：团队 知识共享 演化博弈 白噪声 随机突变理论 突变特征 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]