产权性质、高管薪酬与高管腐败——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Property Rights,Executive Compensation and Executive Corruption:Empirical Evidence from Listed Companies in China

作　　者：赵璨[1] 朱锦余[2] 曹伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国海洋大学管理学院,山东青岛266100 [2]云南财经大学会计学院,云南昆明650000

出　　处：《会计与经济研究》2013年第5期24-37,共14页Accounting and Economics Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(10XJY006)

摘　　要：文章以2007-2012年A股上市公司作为研究样本,根据腐败行为发现的可能性将上市公司高管腐败分为显性腐败和隐性腐败。实证研究发现:(1)对于显性腐败,高管高薪可以起到抑制腐败的作用,但是由于国有企业天生与政府存在亲属关系,这种抑制作用要弱于非国有企业;(2)对于隐性腐败,高薪并不能起到抑制腐败的功效,并且高管薪酬与隐性腐败存在正相关关系,支持了管理层权力理论。相对于国有企业,非国有企业高管薪酬与隐性腐败的正相关关系更为显著。The paper uses a sample of A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2012 and classifies executive corruption into explicit corruption and implicit corruption according to the exposure possibility. It is found that ： （ 1 ） For explicit corruption, high executive salary has suppressing effects. However, the suppressing effect is weaker for stated-owned enterprises than for private-owned enterprises because of the relationship between state-owned enterprises and the government. （2） For implicit corruption, high executive salary is unable to suppress corruption. A positive relationship exists between high executive salary and implicit cor- ruption, which supports the management power theory. In addition, the positive relationship is more promi- nent for private-owned enterprises than for state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：高管薪酬 高管腐败 产权性质 在职消费 

分 类 号：F271.5[经济管理—企业管理]