亚里士多德对“善”的两种论证思路及相互关系  

Aristotle's Two Ways of Argumentation and Interdependence about “Good”

作　　者：赵静波[1,2] 李树燕[3] 

机构地区：[1]海口经济学院,海南海口571127 [2]中国人民大学哲学院,北京100872 [3]昆明学院科学发展研究院,云南昆明650214

出　　处：《南昌大学学报（人文社会科学版）》2014年第1期7-12,共6页Journal of Nanchang University(Humanities and Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目"美德的实在性研究"(12XZX017);国家社会科学基金项目"社会管理视角下边疆民族地区民俗宗教生活变迁研究(13CSH014)

摘　　要：亚里士多德对"善"的阐述是从目的性和功能性两条路径来展开的。在目的性论证中,他将"善"界定为人们所欲求的目的,如果仅从欲望这一角度来理解"善",一般的"善"和具体境遇下对我而言的"善"就会存在分裂的可能。在功能性论证中,亚里士多德将"善"的本质表述为合乎德性的现实活动,用德性限定了欲望的合理性,使对我而言的主观准则上升为绝对的客观法则。通过德性中道,人们维护了合理的欲望,并免于成为他人的手段而保证了自己的目的性;相应地,也促使个人在追求自我幸福的同时尊重他人的合理欲望。在这种情况下,德性与善也就有了内在的关联,"目的善"与"功能善"也就达到了完全契合。Aristotle describes the good by two aspects：purposiveness and functionality. In the demonstration of purposiveness, he defined good as the purpose that people desire to achieve; however, it may cause the possibility of splitting between the ＂general good＂ and the ＂good in specific circumstances＂ if we look at it only from the aspect of desire. In the functionality argument, Aristotle described good as the practical activities in line with the virtue by which the rationality of desire was defined, and for me, this is the turning point where a subjective criterion rose to the objective rule. By virtue moderation, people maintained a reasonable desire, and protected their own purpose in- stead of becoming the others＇ means. Natural disposition, accordingly, also contributed to the well - being of individ- uals in the pursuit of self happiness while respecting the legitimate desires of others. In this case ,virtue and good have established their intrinsic connection where the ＂purposive good＂ and ＂functional good＂ also reached a fully fit.

关 键 词：亚里士多德 德性 善 欲求 幸福 中道 

分 类 号：B502.233[哲学宗教—外国哲学]