论情理裁判的可普遍化证成  

A Study on the Generalization Justification of Judgment Based on Qing( human sentiment)-Li( reason)

作　　者：陈林林[1] 王云清[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学光华法学院,浙江杭州310008

出　　处：《现代法学》2014年第1期22-29,共8页Modern Law Science

基　　金：浙江大学"走向世界的中国法哲学"985工程项目;国家社科基金项目"疑案裁判中的法律判断模型研究"(10CFX033);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助

摘　　要：在解读传统中国的"情理裁判"时,学界往往只关注"情"这一个案表征,而忽略了"情理"本身的可普遍化诉求,以至将中国传统司法视为西方近现代形式法治的对极。事实上在情理裁判的展开过程中,可普遍化证成是一条构成性的司法原则。可普遍化证成为中国古典司法的现代解读,提供了一个新的视角。基于可普遍化证成原则,情理考量能够以恰当的方式进入现代法律论辩的场域内。While working on the ＂judgment based on Qing（ human sentiment）-Li（reason）＂, the academ- ics often fucus on ＂Qing＂ only, rather than the generalized potential of ＂Qing-iI＂, which simply classify the traditional Chinese adjudication as opposed to that of modern West. However, the principle of generalization is a constitutive one in the structure of the judgment based on Qing-Li, which provides a new perspective for the modem analysis of the traditional Chinese adjudication. Based on this principle, the consideration of Qing-Li can be brought into the field of modem legal discourse.

关 键 词：情理 情理裁判 可普遍化原则 一阶证明 二阶证明 

分 类 号：DF72[政治法律—诉讼法学]