“我思”的双重面相——笛卡尔论“意志在判断之中”  

Double Facies of Cartesian Cogito:Descartes' "Will in Judgment"

作　　者：毛竹[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学,北京100871

出　　处：《云南大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第2期26-33,111,共8页The Journal of Yunnan University:Social Sciences Edition

摘　　要：《第一哲学沉思集》以"普遍怀疑"为开端,探寻"清楚分明的确定性"为目的,用"我思"奠定了近代主体性哲学的"新基础",来证明上帝和物质世界存在的"老问题"。笛卡尔在《沉思集》之中"按照思维的顺序"所展开的论证路向,一直被视为近代理性主义者的开端和典范。然而,对于"我思"这个全新的哲学开端,笛卡尔究竟做出了怎样的规定?本文试图从《沉思集》中的"意志"问题入手,展现出隐藏在理性主义者面相下的另一个笛卡尔形象:一个意志论面相的笛卡尔。In Meditations on First Philosophy,Descartes developed his arguments through hyperbolic doubt.With this new method in searching for clear and distinct knowledge,Descartes grounded early modem philosophy with the awakening Ego,which was intended to solve the 'old opinions' of the existence of God and the material world.According to Descartes,the arguments in the first two meditations were said to be unfolded according to the order of reason.This paper,however,will expound how exactly Descartes defined his new subject,the 'Ego Cogito'.Starting from a discussion of the problems of the will in Descartes' res cogitans,it will try to unveil the voluntaristic factors in Descartes' s Cogito,and provide a different viewpoint from the wild-accepted opinion that Descartes is a prototype of the early modern rationalist.

关 键 词：笛卡尔 我思 (cogito) 正在思维着的东西 (res cogitans) 理性 意志 

分 类 号：B565.21[哲学宗教—外国哲学]