可说与不可说——维特根斯坦逻辑的形而上学思想研究  

What Can Be Said and What Cannot Be

作　　者：李蜀人[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南民族大学政治学院

出　　处：《哲学研究》2014年第7期92-98,128,共7页Philosophical Research

基　　金：西南民族大学中国近现代哲学研究所的资助

摘　　要：一 在维特根斯坦看来，逻辑实证主义拒斥形而上学的理由还不充分，对于语言和逻辑的关系还不十分了解，而日常语言分析学派还没有看到语言的本质。因此，他认为，必须将语言和逻辑联系在一起来研究，从中找到人的认识边界。而一旦认识的边界清楚了，人的思维界限也就必然清楚了。思维界限划出来了后，我们就能清楚地知道哲学范围或领域了。只有这些范围或领域清楚了，哲学的意义才能够得到澄清。The paper will point out the analysis philosophy has been very much in metaphysics after researching Wittgenstein's early thought,though it has been said usually that metaphysics is rejected by the analysis philosophy.The seven propositions in the book Tractatus Logico-philosophicus by Wittgenstein are spread out surrounding the metaphysical problem of world.World is logic in his view,and logic can be recognized.He put up the thought that what can be said at all can be said clearly;and whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent.He names this something that cannot speak as the logic substance because the substance can be sill thought.His metaphysics may be called logic metaphysics in this meaning.

关 键 词：逻辑实证主义 维特根斯坦 形而上学思想 语言的本质 拒斥形而上学 分析学派 日常语言 逻辑联系 

分 类 号：B561.59[哲学宗教—外国哲学]